



REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS IN TRANSPORT
SECTOR FOR INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS IN RAILWAY TRAFFIC
BELGRADE

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ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 2025





The Center for Investigation of Accidents in Transport (hereinafter referred to as: CINS) is independent in its work and conducts independent accident investigations. The aim of an investigation is to identify the causes and the possibility of improving safety on the railways and to prevent accidents by issuing safety recommendations.

In accordance with the Article 33 of the Law on Investigation of Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic Accidents ("Official Gazette of RS" No. 66/15 and 83/18) and the Article 23 of the Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of EU (Railway Safety Directive), CINS drafted and published the Annual Report.

Annual Report for 2025 consists of:

- Information on CINS
- Investigative procedure in the field of Railway Traffic
- Investigations opened in 2025
- Investigations closed in 2025
- Issued safety recommendations
- Measures taken based on the issued recommendations



Glossary:

RS	Republic of Serbia
CINS	Center for Investigation of Accidents in Transport
MGSI	Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure
IŽS	Infrastructure of Serbian Railways
a.d.	Joint Stock Company
d.o.o.	Ltd.
US	Constitutional Court
JŽ	Yugoslav Railways
ZJŽ	Community of Yugoslav Railways
ŽS	Railways of Serbia
EMV	Electro motor train
DMV	Diesel motor train
JP	Public Enterprise
EPS	Electric power plant of Serbia
TENT	Thermo Power Plant “Nikola Tesla”
EU	European Union
MUP	Ministry of Interior
NIS	Petroleum Industry of Serbia
PU	Police Administration
SS	Safety - signalling
RID	Rulebook on International Rail Transport of Dangerous Goods



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1. CINS

1.1. Legal Framework

The implementation of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and the Council in the legislation of RS was carried out by the adoption of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 66/15 and 83/18), and The Law on Railway System Interoperability (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 62/2023) and on the date of entry into force of the Law on Safety in Railway Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/18), that is, on June 8th, 2018 the Law on Railway Safety and Interoperability (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 104/13, 66/15 - other laws, 92/15 and 113/17 - other law) ceases to be valid, except for the provision of Article 78, paragraph 1 point 5) subpoint (1), which ceases to, be valid after three years from the date of entry into force of this Law, i.e. on June 8th, 2021.

CINS, which includes the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, is an independent organization that is conducting investigations following serious accidents within the railway system. In addition to serious accidents, CINS may also investigate other accidents and incidents that could potentially lead to serious accidents, including technical failures of structural subsystems or interoperability constituents, in accordance with the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18). The Center has the discretion to determine whether to initiate an investigation into other accidents and incidents.

Under the Law on Railway Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/18), the infrastructure manager and railway undertaking are required, independently of CINS, to carry out investigations into the causes and consequences of accidents and incidents in railway traffic, as well as the circumstances in which they occurred.

Under the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18), CINS, through the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, conducts investigations independently of all parties and organizations responsible for railway traffic. CINS conducts investigations following serious accidents on the railway system with the aim of potentially improving railway safety and preventing accidents.

Professional activities related to investigations are independent of criminal investigations or other parallel investigations aimed at establishing liability or determining the degree of culpability.

The investigation and determination of the causes of accidents are not intended to establish criminal, commercial offense, misdemeanour, disciplinary, civil, or any other form of liability.



1.2. Role and goal

According to the Law on the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 66/15 and 83/18), CINS was established, as of July 2015, as a special organization whose competence is the performance of professional work related to the investigation of accidents and serious accidents in air traffic, serious accidents, other accidents and incidents in railway traffic, very serious maritime accidents, serious maritime accidents, maritime accidents, maritime incidents, serious inland navigation incidents and inland navigation incidents in waterborne traffic. CINS has the status of a legal entity, and the headquarters of CINS is in Belgrade.

Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic carries out tasks that are within the competence of CINS, regarding railway traffic with the aim of possible improvement of safety on the railway by issuing safety recommendations.

Pursuant to Article 35 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18), CINS issues safety recommendations based on the analysis of data and the results of the investigation conducted. The recommendations are addressed to the Directorate for Railways and, where necessary, to other authorities and organizations in RS, as well as to relevant authorities and organizations of other countries and international organizations. The Directorate for Railways shall take measures to ensure that the safety recommendations are taken into consideration and acted upon. The Directorate for Railways and other authorities and organizations, except for authorities and organizations of other countries and international organizations, are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that CINS safety recommendations are duly taken into consideration and, as appropriate, acted upon. The Directorate for Railways and other authorities and organizations to which safety recommendations have been addressed, except for authorities and organizations of other countries and international organizations, are required to submit to CINS, at least once a year, a report on the measures taken or planned to be taken on the basis of the safety recommendations issued during the previous year, no later than 31st July of the current year.

The Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18) does not apply to underground railways (metros), trams, or other types of light rail.

The main activities of CINS, Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, are:

- Investigation of serious accidents, other accidents, and incidents within the railway system.
- Preparation of final reports on individual investigations conducted, which may contain safety recommendations aimed at improving safety in railway traffic.

CINS also performs other duties prescribed by the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

1.3. Organization of CINS

The following basic internal organizational units have been established within CINS: the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Air Traffic, the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic and the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Waterborne Traffic. An internal organizational unit, the General Affairs Department, has also been established within CINS outside the Sectors.

The organizational structure of CINS is shown in Figure 1.3.1.




Figure 1.3.1: Structure of CINS

The Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic became operational on 26th June 2017. Under the Rulebook on Internal Organization and Classification of workplaces at the Center for Investigation of Accidents in Transport, No. 110-00-2/2022-04, dated 13th December 2022, which entered into force on 4th January 2023, five positions are classified within the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic: Head of the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic - Main Investigator for Railway Traffic, Senior Adviser for Coordination of Investigation and Railway Accidents Analysis, Senior Adviser for Coordination of Investigation and Railway Accidents Analysis, Independent Adviser for Investigation and Railway Accidents Analysis and Independent Adviser for Investigation and Railway Accidents Analysis.

In 2025, the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic was staffed by:

1. Head of the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic - Main Investigator for Railway Traffic, and
2. Senior Adviser for Coordination of Investigations and Analysis of Accidents in Railway Traffic.

CINS, Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, operates independently and is independent of all other authorities and organizations responsible for railway traffic (MGSI, the Directorate for Railways), as well as of all legal entities and individuals whose interests may conflict with the tasks and powers of CINS.

1.4. Organizations competent for the railway system

The organizations responsible for the railway system in RS are the MGSI, the Directorate for Railways, and CINS.

The MGSI performs public administration tasks related to the regulation and provision of the transport system. MGSI is responsible for drafting laws adopted by the legislative authority. The legislative authority in RS is the National Assembly. MGSI establishes the legal framework by developing railway regulations and implementing EU legislation. MGSI also performs tasks related to the supervision of domestic and international transport and intermodal transport, as well as the regulation and safety of the technical and technological traffic system.

The Directorate for Railways performs public administration tasks in the field of railways as defined by the Law on Railways (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 41/2018 and 62/2023), the Law on Railway Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/18), and the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 62/2023). The Directorate for Railways performs tasks related to the regulation of the railway services market, as well as tasks related to the regulation of railway traffic safety and interoperability. The Directorate for Railways is responsible for issuing, suspending, and revoking licenses for railway infrastructure management and transport licenses; adopting secondary legislation; and participating in international cooperation in the field of railway traffic carried out by the MGSI.

CINS is an independent organization that performs public administration tasks in the field of accident and incident investigation in accordance with the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18). CINS is responsible for carrying out professional activities related to the investigation of accidents and serious incidents in air traffic, serious accidents, other accidents and incidents in railway traffic, very serious marine casualties, serious marine casualties, marine casualties and marine incidents, as well as serious navigation accidents and navigation accidents in waterborne traffic.

2. INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE FIELD OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC

2.1. Accidents and incidents that are investigated

Pursuant to the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", Nos. 66/15 and 83/18), CINS conducts investigations following serious accidents within the railway system with the aim of potentially improving railway safety and preventing new accidents caused by the same or similar causes.

In addition to serious accidents, CINS may investigate other accidents and incidents that could potentially lead to serious accidents, including technical failures of structural subsystems and interoperability constituents.

CINS has the discretion to decide whether to initiate an investigation into other accidents and incidents. The scope of the investigations and the procedure for conducting such investigations are determined by CINS.

Pursuant to the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette RS", Nos. 66/15 and 83/18), accidents and incidents may be classified as follows:

1. Serious accident in railway traffic is a collision or derailment of the train results in the death of at least one person or serious injury to five or more persons or causing great material damage to the railway vehicles, railway infrastructure, or the environment, as well as other similar accident which has an obvious impact on railway safety or the safety management.
2. Accident in railway traffic is an unwanted or unintended sudden event, or a specific sequence of such events, with harmful consequences (collisions, derailments, train collisions with obstacles, level-crossing accidents, accidents involving persons caused by moving railway vehicles, fires, etc.).
3. Incident in the railway traffic is an event associated with the train or shunting composition and adversely affects the safety of the traffic.

Significant damage in railway traffic means damage which CINS, upon arriving at the accident site, estimates to amount to at least two million euros.

Investigation means a procedure comprising the collection and analysis of data, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of causes, and, as applicable, the issuance of safety recommendations aimed at preventing serious accidents in railway traffic.

Fatal injury means an injury sustained by a person in a serious railway accident that results in the death of that person within 30 days of the injuries sustained in the serious railway accident.

Seriously injured person means any injured person who is hospitalized for more than 24 hours as a result of an accident, excluding attempted suicide.

2.2. Organizations involved in the process of investigation

Investigations of serious accidents, other accidents, and incidents within the railway system may be conducted by different organizations and economic entities in accordance with their respective legal obligations, as follows:

- The Infrastructure Manager and Railway Undertakings, pursuant to the Law on Railway Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 41/18) and their safety management systems, are responsible for determining the causes and taking measures based on the results of their investigations;
- CINS investigates serious accidents, other accidents, and incidents with the aim of determining their causes and issuing safety recommendations to improve safety within the railway system;
- The Public Prosecutor's Office and the Police investigate accidents and incidents in order to establish liability for offences or criminal acts committed.

2.3. The manner in which CINS approaches to investigation

CINS, i.e. the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, conducts investigations to determine the causes in order to issue safety recommendations as a preventive measure aimed at improving the safety of the railway system and reducing the number of accidents and incidents. The investigations conducted by CINS are not intended to establish liability.

CINS is on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

For the purposes of investigating each accident or incident, the Director of CINS establishes, by decision, a Working Group headed by the Main Investigator in Railway Traffic and for the members of the working group other employees of CINS i.e. the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic are appointed, which participate in the affairs of the investigation of accidents and incidents, as well as other professionals outside CINS, in accordance with the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 66/15 and 83/18).

After receiving notification of an accident or incident within the railway system, CINS decides whether or not to visit the site where the accident or incident occurred. At the site of the accident or incident, CINS conducts an on-site examination and verifies the facts collected and the actions taken by the infrastructure manager and the railway undertaking (where either or both of them are involved in the investigation of the accident or incident).

The decision to initiate an investigation may be made immediately upon receipt of notification of the accident or incident, or after all relevant facts necessary for making a decision to initiate an investigation into a particular accident or incident have been collected.

Once an investigation has been initiated, CINS, through the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, shall notify MGSI, and the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) of the initiated investigation, no later than seven days from the date of the decision, in accordance with the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Upon completion of the investigation, CINS publishes the Final Report and safety recommendation on its website www.cins.gov.rs. Also, the reports of the Center, i.e. the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, are published on the website of the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) https://www.era.europa.eu/domains/accident-incident/rail-accident-investigation_en.

The form of the report is in accordance with the Rulebook on the content of the final report on investigations of accidents and incidents in railway traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 89/15).

3. INVESTIGATIONS OPENED IN 2025

In 2025, the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic initiated three investigations.

The basic information on the investigations initiated by the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic in 2025 is presented in Table 3.1.



Table 3.1: Review of investigations opened in 2025

TYPES OF ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS	No.	[%]
Serious accidents	2	66.7
Accidents	1	33.3
Incidents	0	0.0
TOTAL:	3	100.0

The basic information on people fatally injured and injured in the investigations initiated by the Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic in 2025 is presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Review of fatally injured and injured for investigations initiated in 2025

	Passenger	Railway staff	Third persons	Total
Fatally injured	-	1	1	2
Seriously injured	-	-	-	-
Lightly injured	-	-	-	-

**Figure 3.1:** Investigations opened in 2025**Figure 3.2:** Fatally injured and injured in 2025

3.1. Derailment of the train No. 51202

On 11.02.2025 at 17:46, at km 30+522 of the main railway line No. 103 (Belgrade Center) - Rakovica - Jajinci - Mala Krsna - Velika Plana, during the movement of train No. 51202 (locomotive 193-910 and 15 (fifteen) wagon-tanks loaded with sulfuric acid (RID 80/1830), operated by "Srbija Kargo" a.d.), between the Lipe junction and Vrčin station, the eleventh wagon (wagon No. 33 87 7866 801-6) derailed with one bogie. After the derailment, train No. 51202 continued moving towards Vrčin station. In Vrčin station, while running on the second track, at switch No. 4L (the switch by which the first track branches off from the second track), the first (derailed) bogie of the eleventh wagon moved in the direction of the first track, while the second bogie of the eleventh wagon and the remainder of train No. 51202 continued moving along the second track. On that occasion, there occurred:

- decoupling of the train between the tenth wagon (wagon No. 33 72 7867 822-8) and the eleventh wagon (wagon No. 33 87 7866 801-6),
- the impact of the front end of the eleventh wagon against catenary support KM No. 26,
- derailment of the second bogie,
- the rotation of the derailed wagon by 180 degrees around its vertical axis,
- the overturning of the same wagon onto its side, to the left, viewed in the direction of travel of the train,
- the derailment of the twelfth wagon (wagon No. 33 72 7867 837-6) with one bogie (the first bogie, viewed in the direction of travel of the train), and
- the stopping of the train.

Sulfuric acid leaked from the tank of the overturned wagon through the manhole cover of the tank vessel.

Due to the release (leakage) of sulfuric acid (classified under RID as a corrosive or slightly corrosive substance containing more than 51% pure acid), members of MUP RS, the Police Directorate for the City of Belgrade, and members MUP RS, Emergency Situations Sector, arrived at the scene. In addition, upon learning of the accident, special measures were also taken by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Sector for Environmental Supervision and Preventive Action, and the City Institute of Public Health.

Review of the accident site is shown in Figs 3.1.1, 3.1.2. и 3.1.3.



Fig. 3.1.1: View of the derailment site (looking in the direction of train travel)



Fig 3.1.2: Review of the place of overturning of wagons



Figure 3.1.3: Review of the place of overturning of wagons

There were no fatalities or injuries in this accident.

Material damage was caused to the infrastructure, railway vehicles, and goods.

The consequences of the accident were remedied with the engagement of the professional services and resources of “IŽS” a.d., “Srbija Kargo” a.d., “Elixir Group” d.o.o., Patenting d.o.o. Belgrade, LTH Šabac, “ZGOP” d.o.o. Novi Sad, “ATM BG” d.o.o. New Belgrade, and “Galeb signalizacija” d.o.o. Šabac.

As a result of this accident, railway traffic was interrupted between Vrčin Station and Lipe Junction. The interruption of traffic lasted until 08:00 on 20th October 2025, when the aforementioned section of the railway line was reopened to train traffic.

Category: Accident

Fatally injured and injured: NA

Material damage: There exists on infrastructure, railway vehicles and the goods

3.2. Collision of a locomotive with a Wagon Inspector at Vreoci Station

On 13 March 2025, at 19:43, in the area operated by the industrial railway infrastructure manager AD “EPS” Belgrade, TENT Obrenovac Branch, at Vreoci Station, on Track 3, during a locomotive movement, locomotive 443-10, with a wagon of type Kklmo coupled to it, struck a wagon inspector employed by AD “EPS” Belgrade, TENT Obrenovac Branch, at Vreoci Station. As a result, the wagon inspector sustained serious injuries and died at the scene.

As part of the activities related to loading coal into railway wagons, locomotive 443-10 was moved from Track 3 in the direction of the entry turnouts of Vreoci Station in order to move from Track 3 to Track 2. The wagon inspector was standing within the clearance profile of Track 3 at Vreoci Station in order to carry out an inspection by observing Train No. 10 as it passed, which was travelling on Track 4 while entering Vreoci Station.

A view of the site of the serious accident is shown in Figure 3.2.1.



Figure 3.2.1: Appearance of the place of the serious accident

Following the occurrence of the serious accident, locomotives 443-10 and 441-04 were not moved from the locations where they had stopped after the body of the deceased wagon inspector was noticed.

One person was fatally injured in this serious accident. There were no injured persons.

No material damage was caused to railway vehicles, infrastructure, or the property of third parties.

As a result of this serious accident, all shunting movements at Vreoci Station were suspended.

Category: Serious accident

Fatally injured and injured: One person is fatally injured

Material damage: NA

3.3. On the level crossing, colliding of the train No. 25542 on the road vehicle

On 12th June 2025, at 12:45, on regional railway line No. 207: Novi Sad - Odžaci - Bogojevo, at a level crossing protected by road traffic signs and a required visibility zone, located between Futog and Petrovac Gložan stations at km 15+332, train No. 25442 (operated by “Srbija Voz” a.d.) collided with a Toyota RAV4 road passenger vehicle, registration number NS 318-SL.

The Toyota RAV4 road passenger vehicle was travelling along an unclassified agricultural road from the direction of the settlement of Futog towards the fields. Upon approaching the level crossing at km 15+332, the road passenger vehicle entered the railway clearance profile at the level crossing immediately before the arrival of the train.

Train No. 25442 (DMV 711-051/052) was travelling on regional railway line No. 207: Novi Sad - Odžaci - Bogojevo, from the direction of Futog Station towards Petrovac Gložan station. Upon approaching the level crossing at km 15+332, the train collided with the road passenger vehicle, which had entered the railway clearance profile immediately before the arrival of the train.

Following the collision, Train No. 25442 continued moving for a distance of 440 m, after which it came to a stop. During this event, DMV 711-051/052 did not derail.

Following the impact, the train threw the road passenger vehicle off the track to the right side, relative to the direction of train travel.

As a result, the driver of the road passenger vehicle sustained serious injuries and died at the scene.

A view of the site of the serious accident is shown in Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.



Figure 3.3.1: Reivew of the location where the road passenger vehicle came to a stop following the serious accident



Figure 3.3.2: View of the stopping location and Train No. 25442

One person was fatally injured in this serious accident (the driver of the road vehicle).

Material damage was caused to the railway vehicles and the road passenger vehicle.

As a result of this serious accident, railway traffic was interrupted between Futog and Petrovac Gložan stations. The interruption of traffic lasted until 20:56 on 12th June 2025, when the aforementioned section of the railway line was reopened to train traffic.

Category: Serious accident

Fatally injured and injured: One person is fatally injured

Material damage: Exists on the railway vehicles and the road passenger vehicles

4. INVESTIGATION REPORTS FINISHED IN 2025

4.1. Derailment of the train No. 52770

4.1.1. Short description of the accident

On 14th February 2019, at 01:45, at km 55+252 of the regional railway line Crveni Krst - Zaječar - Prahovo Pristanište, between Svrljig and Knjaževac stations, while travelling from Svrljig Station towards Knjaževac Station, Train No. 52770 derailed on the open line, on a concrete bridge over the Svrljiški Timok River, between Tunnel No. 21 and Tunnel No. 22. Of the train formation, counting from the locomotive 661-318, the following wagons derailed: the third wagon, Zags series, No. 33 87 7814 136-0, with the two axles of the first bogie; the fourth wagon, Zags series, No. 33 80 7818 085-2, with all axles, the fifth wagon, Zags series, No. 33 80 7818 094-4, with all axles, the sixth wagon, Zags series, No. 33 87 7813 564-4, with all axles and the seventh wagon, Zags series, No. 33 87 7816 547-6, with one axle of the second bogie.



Figure 4.1.1.1: Review of the derailment point (concrete bridge between Tunnel No. 21 and Tunnel No. 22)



Figure 4.1.1.2: Review of the parts of the derailed wagons



Figure 4.1.1.3: Review of the parts of the derailed wagons



Figure 4.1.1.4: Review of the parts of the derailed wagons

Following the derailment, the train continued for another 85 m before coming to a stop. The derailed wagons were found within the track area, remaining upright on their wheels. There was no tilting or overturning of the wagons, and there was no leakage of the cargo.

Train No. 52770 was operating on the Crveni Krst - Prahovo route. The train formation consisted of a locomotive operated by the railway undertaking "NCL Neo Cargo Logistic" d.o.o., series 661-318, and 14 (fourteen) tank wagons of the Za series (13 of the Zags series



and 1 of the Zagkk series). All wagon tanks forming part of Train No. 52770 were loaded with anhydrous ammonia (RID 268/1005, NHM code 2814.10). The net mass of the entire shipment of anhydrous ammonia was 509 280 kg.

The consequences of this accident (lifting the derailed tank wagons and removing them from the site) were remedied with the engagement of the professional services and resources of “IŽS” a.d., with the presence of members of MUP RS, the Emergency Situations Sector, the Department for Emergency Situations in Zaječar, and the local Fire and Rescue Unit in Knjaževac.

As a result of this accident, railway traffic between Svrljig and Knjaževac stations was interrupted from 14 February 2019 until 13 August 2021.

Category: Accident

Fatally injured and injured: NA

Material damage: Exists on infrastructure and the railway vehicles

The breakdown of the material damage incurred is as follows:

Damage to railway vehicles (wagons forming part of the train):	1 323 005,50	RSD
Total costs of lifting the derailed wagons:	691 652,11	RSD
Damage to the railway line and railway installations:	1 039 278,00	RSD
Total direct material damage:	3 053 935,61	RSD

The damage is stated in the official currency of RS (Dinar - RSD).

According to the official middle exchange rate of the National Bank of Serbia on 14 February 2019, which was EUR 1 (Euro) = 118.1687 RSD (Dinars), the total material damage resulting from the accident amounted to EUR 25,843.86

4.1.2. The causes of accident determined by investigation

The direct and immediate cause of the accident was the spreading of the rails under load and the inner wheel falling into the track in a curve. The wheel fall occurred due to the unsatisfactory condition of the track in the section where the accident took place. In the narrowest area of the derailment, there was a lack of or loose fastening and connecting equipment, decayed and cracked sleepers in sequence, combined with deviations in track geometry: rail spreading (deviation +40 mm), cant (deviation - 42 mm) and twist (deviation 36 mm), which is above the limit for urgent intervention - that is, the error of type “C”.

Track maintenance on the observed section was not conducted in accordance with the Regulations on Technical Conditions and Maintenance of the Railway Track Superstructure (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 39/16 and 74/16), considering the years since the last track repairs, as well as the insufficient number of personnel, machinery, and tools (see sections 3.3.6 and 4.2.6).

The Instruction on Unified Criteria for Track Condition Control on the Railway Network JŽ (Instruction 339) from 2001/2004 introduced “speed reduction” as an alternative measure for cases of “unsatisfactory” track condition (track geometry defects exceeding operational limits, classified as “Type C”). This measure did not exist in earlier versions of the Instruction (e.g., the 1989 version). Furthermore, a paragraph from the 1989 version of Instruction 339 was removed, which stipulated that measures should be taken to prevent the exceedance of operational limits before they are reached.

The current Regulation on the Maintenance of the Super and Sub Structure of Railway Tracks (see section 3.3.7) also lists the following measures for reducing the risk of derailment to an acceptable level in cases of “Type C” defects or reaching the limits for urgent intervention (Immediate Action Limit - IAL): closing the track, restoring track geometry, or reducing speed. This formulation was adopted from the EN 13848-5 standard. However, these measures should not be understood as alternatives; rather, the appropriate measure must be applied in each specific case.

The consequences of track widening and twist beyond operational limits (classified as “Type C” defects or “IAL” - Immediate Action Limit) cannot be mitigated by reducing speed. On the contrary, traveling at low speeds on twisted tracks in sharp curves with superelevation creates precisely the conditions under which derailment most easily occurs through the leading wheel climbing the rail (see EN 14363, section 6.1).

Neither the current Regulation on the Maintenance of the Super and Sub Structure of Railway Tracks nor Instruction 339 explicitly and clearly define operational limits for the condition of sleepers and fastening equipment, at which immediate corrective measures must be taken or the track must be closed to traffic due to safety risks. (For example, there is no specification of the maximum number of consecutive sleepers with non-functional fastening equipment that would require immediate intervention or closure of the track. In EN 14363, several safety criteria use a travelled distance of 2 meters as a reference for derailment risk, which could serve as a solid basis for introducing such a criterion).

The consequences of non-functional fastening equipment in curves with superelevation cannot be mitigated by reducing speed. On the contrary, traveling through a curve with superelevation at a low speed below the equilibrium speed (corresponding to the superelevation) creates an excess of superelevation. As a result, the vehicle tilts towards the inner side of the curve, increasing the vertical forces on the inner wheels and decreasing them on the outer wheels. In combination with track twist, two wheels on one diagonal of the bogie experience additional vertical loading, while the two on the opposite diagonal are unloaded. Guiding forces in the curve on the leading axle of conventional bogies (see section 4.2.1, figure 4.2.1.6.), when fastening equipment is non-functional, can sufficiently spread or twist the rails. In such a situation, due to increased vertical loading, the inner wheel of the leading axle most easily falls into the track. This is precisely what happened in this accident, as well as in several other accidents investigated by CINS.

The consequences of vertical deviations (stability) and transverse deviations in track geometry beyond the “Type C” (or “IAL”) limit can, however, be mitigated by reducing speed.

4.1.3. Additional remarks regarding deficiencies and shortcomings identified during the investigation, but not relevant to the conclusions concerning the causes

NA

4.1.4. Issued safety recommendations

To the Directorate for Railways the following recommendations are issued: SR_01/25, SR_02/25, SR_03/25, SR_04/25 and SR_05/25

- SR_01/25** The Directorate for Railways should, as soon as possible, amend the current Regulation on the Maintenance of the Super and Structure of Railway Tracks (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 39/2023) to define the limit states of track elements requiring immediate rectification or track closure until the unacceptable condition is resolved. Additionally, the regulation should stipulate that in cases of “Type C” defects or those exceeding the “IAL” (Immediate Action Limit) for track widening and twist, speed reduction cannot be considered a measure to mitigate the risk of derailment. Instead, only urgent intervention or track closure should be undertaken.
- SR_02/25** The Directorate for Railways, in accordance with Article 37 of the Law on Railway Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 41/18), should amend and supplement the Regulation on Technical Conditions and Maintenance of the Railway Telecommunications Network (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 68/21). In Section II: Technical Conditions for the Railway Telecommunications Network, the regulation should define the minimum technical requirements for equipping railway lines with telecommunication devices to ensure reliable communication between traffic control personnel and train drivers. These requirements should be based on factors such as train speed, track categorization, volume of railway traffic, and similar considerations.
- SR_03/25** “IŽS” a.d, should amend and supplement the Instruction on Unified Criteria for Track Condition Control on the Railway Network (Instruction 339, “Official Gazette of the ZJŽ” No. 2/2001 and 4/2004). The amendments should stipulate that in cases of “Type C” defects or those exceeding the “IAL” (Immediate Action Limit), for track widening and twist, speed reduction cannot be considered a measure to mitigate the risk of derailment. Instead, only urgent intervention or track closure should be implemented.
- SR_04/25** “IŽS” a.d, should review the adequacy of the current provisions in the Regulation on the Organization and Systematization of Work Positions of the Joint Stock Company for the Management of Public Railway Infrastructure “Infrastruktura Železnice Srbije” Belgrade. It should also assess the possibility of ensuring an appropriate number of personnel in construction activities, both on the section of the railway where the accident occurred and across the entire network, with the aim of ensuring the safe operation of railway traffic. In line with the appropriate number of personnel, the company should plan the procurement of the necessary machinery and tools, all in the interest of maintaining the safety of railway traffic.

SR_05/25 “IŽS” a.d, when approving special shipments/consignments that exceed the allowed axle load or allowed weight per meter of track on a transport route or section of the transport route, it is mandatory to conduct an analysis of the track’s load-bearing capacity and assess the condition of the super and substructure of the track.

To the MGSi the recommendations SR_06/25 and SR_07/25 are issued:

SR_06/25 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure, Sector for Railways and Intermodal Transport, considering that Article 49 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023) stipulates that the infrastructure register is maintained by the European Union Agency for Railways, and that this has not been formally enabled for infrastructure managers in RS in practice, should resolve this issue to ensure the application of the provisions of Article 49 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023). If this issue is not resolved, or the provisions of Article 49 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023) cannot be applied, the Ministry should amend and supplement the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023), or restore the provisions of Article 34 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 41/2018), as well as the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” Nos. 41/2018 and 16/2022 - Authentic Interpretation), in order to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructure register by the Directorate for Railways.

SR_07/25 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure, Sector for Inspection Supervision, Railway Traffic Inspection Department, should, in accordance with Article 50 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023), to carry out an inspection supervision at “IŽS” a.d. and take measures within its authority regarding the obtaining of permits for renovated and upgraded tracks in accordance with Article 36 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023), starting from the adoption of the first version of the law in 2018.

4.2. Collision of trains No. 7112 and 52601

4.2.1. Short description of the accident

On 17 May 2024, at 18:24, on main railway line No. 107 Belgrade Centre - Pančevo Glavna - Vršac - State Border - (Stamora Moravita), between Vukov Spomenik station and the junction and stopping place Pančevački Most, on the right-hand track of the double-track railway line, at km 4+392, there occurred overtaking and collision of the trains No. 7112 (EMV 412/416-005/032, railway undertaking “Srbijavoz” a.d.), which was moving, and No. 52601 (locomotive 193-912 and 28 (twenty-eight) empty E-series wagons, railway undertaking “Srbija Kargo” a.d.), which was stationary.

The collision occurred when the front of train No. 7112 (the front section of motor coach 412-005), which was moving, struck the rear of train No. 52601 (the last wagon, No. 31 72 5959 453-7), which was stationary in front of the To 2 protecting signal at the Pančevački Most operating point.

Upon impact, due to the kinetic energy of the moving train No. 7112, train No. 52601 was displaced. Following the impact, the trains continued moving for approximately 10 m, after which they came to a stop. As a result, motor coach 412-005 of EMU 412/416-005/032 of train No. 7112 derailed from both bogies, while the last wagon, No. 31 72 5959 453-7, forming part of train No. 52601, derailed from one bogie (the second bogie when viewed in the direction of travel).

The site of the serious accident is shown in Figures 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3.



Figure 4.2.1.1: Damage to the front section of motor coach 412-005 of train No. 7112 after the accident



Figure 4.2.1.2: Deformations in the passenger compartment of motor coach 412-005 of train No.7112 after the accident



Figure 4.2.1.3: Deformation of wagon No. 31 72 5959 453-7 of train No. 52601 after the accident



Material damage occurred to the infrastructure and railway vehicles. No material damage was caused to goods or the property of third parties.

There were no fatalities in this accident. A total of seven persons were injured (passengers and railway employees of “Srbijavoz” a.d. and “Srbija Kargo” a.d. who were on trains No. 7112 and 52601). Of these, two persons (railway employees of “Srbijavoz” a.d.) sustained serious injuries, while five persons sustained lightly injuries (one railway employee of “Srbija Kargo” a.d. and four passengers from train No. 7112).

At the scene, to provide assistance to the injured, personnel from the Belgrade Institute for Emergency Medicine (emergency medical service), members of the MUP RS, the Emergency Situations Sector, the Belgrade Emergency Situations Administration, the Zvezdara, Voždovac and Borča Fire and Rescue Units, as well as members of the MUP RS, the PU Belgrade, were deployed.

The consequences of the accident were dealt with through the engagement of the professional services and resources of “IŽS” a.d., “Srbija Voz” a.d. and “Srbija Kargo” a.d.

As a result of the accident, railway traffic was suspended between Vukov Spomenik station and the junction and stopping place Pančevački Most on both tracks of the double-track railway line. Traffic on the left-hand track remained suspended until 01:17 on 18 May 2024. Following the removal of the damaged railway vehicles from the track and the repair of the damaged infrastructure, the right-hand track was also reopened to traffic at 14:10 on 20 May 2024.

Category: Accident
Fatally injured and injured: No fatally injured, 2 (two) seriously and 5 (five) lightly injured people
Material damage: On the railway vehicles and infrastructure

The breakdown of the material damage incurred is as follows:

Damage to EMV 412/416-005/032:	45 950 000.00	RSD
Damage to the wagon No. 31 72 5959 453-7:	990 789.84	RSD
Damage to the infrastructure:	330 710.00	RSD
Damage to the infrastructure as a consequence of the accident, after starting part of the train No. 52601:	4 214 784.00	RSD
Expenses of intervention of the breakdown train of “IŽS” a.d.:	635 359.00	RSD
Engagement of the breakdown train of “Srbija Kargo” a.d.:	229 150.00	RSD
Total direct material damage:	48 136 008.84	RSD

The damage is stated in the official currency of RS (Dinar - RSD).

According to the official middle exchange rate of the National Bank of Serbia on 17 May 2024, which was 1 EUR (Euro) = 117.1050 RSD (Dinars), the total material damage resulting from the accident amounted to 411 049.99 EUR (Euros).

4.2.2. Causes of accident determined by investigation

The direct cause of the accident is that two trains were at the same time on a one block section, where one train was standing still (train No 52601), while the other train was moving (train No 7112), which is contrary to the provision of paragraph 3 of Article 122 of the Traffic Rulebook (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 34/22 and 107/22).

The train driver of the train No 7112 passed the protective signal Su92 which was showing aspect of a signal 4: “Stop“, which is contrary to the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Rulebook on types of signals, signal markings and line markings (“Official Gazette of RS” No 51/20 and 29/25).

Since the train driver of the train No. 7112 did not have an order to pass the protective signal Su92 prohibiting further travel, issued by General Order I or by phonogram from the person regulating traffic (train dispatcher), he was obliged to stop the train, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Rulebook on types of signals, signal markings and line markings (“Official Gazette of RS“, No. 51/20 and 29/25). If he had stopped in front of the protective signal showing a signal for prohibited travel, the train driver would have had the option to request notification from the train dispatcher of the next station (Pančevački Most junction and stopping place) by telephone after three minutes at the respective signal, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Article 228 of the Traffic Rulebook (“Official Gazette of RS“, No. 34/22 and 107/22), which he had not done.

The reasons for this action of the train driver may be contained in his short professional experience and the fact that he received the order via General Order I on permitted running past the automatic block signal T12 which prohibited further running and is located at the inter-station distance Pančevački Most - Krnjača, not at the Pančevački Most junction, but at the Vukov Spomenik station.

4.2.3. Additional remarks on shortcoming and flaws determined during investigation, not relevant for conclusions on the causes

By analyzing the diagnostic record from the MMI 10 device, it can be concluded that the train dispatchers on duty are not logging into the device with their own username and password. For any of the recorded events in the time period from 00:00 to 19:26, the names of the train dispatchers who performed the service in the specified period were not entered in the column containing the operator’s name.

In the Operating Rules of the Vukov Spomenik station, part I, document No. 31/18-I-2252 of 28.12.2018, in part B - provisions regarding the organization and regulation of traffic, point 6.3. Traffic regulation in conditions of disruptions and malfunctions refers to the application of regulations that are no longer valid. Also, in part A - description of the station’s infrastructure facilities and associated distances between stations, point 1.2. data on neighboring and subordinate stations, stations and tracks that are no longer in function are listed.

The Instruction on the organization of traffic and the operation of traffic services on sections of the railways between the Beograd Centar, Pančevo Glavna, Rakovica and Topčider stations, No. 4/2019-1250/1-291 of 14.01.2019. of “IŽS“ a.d., point 2 of Article 2 and point 12 of Article 45, lists the locations and railway lines that are no longer in function and refers to the application of regulations that are no longer valid.

Except for the mentioned parts of the Operational rules for the Vukov Spomenik station, Part I (Regulation No. 31/18-I-2252 of 28.12.2018) and the Instructions on the Organization of Traffic and the Provision of Traffic Services on Sections of the Railway Lines between the Beograd Centar, Pančevo Glavna, Rakovica and Topčider stations (No. 4/2019-1250/1-291 of 14.01.2019, "IŽS" a.d.), the same or similar phenomena can be observed throughout the text of the mentioned documents.

By analyzing the duration of disturbances on SS devices, it can be concluded that the lack of spare parts is the cause of the long duration of disturbances. The duration of disturbances has a direct consequence in reduced safety of railway traffic.

4.2.4. Issued safety recommendations

To the Directorate for Railways the recommendations are issued SR_08/25, SR_09/25, SR_10/25 and SR_11/25

BP_08/25 "IŽS" a.d. should amend the Business order of the Vukov Spomenik station, part I, document No. 31/18-I-2252 of 28.12.2018 and the Instructions on the organization and operation of the operational service on parts of railway lines between the Beograd Centar, Pančevo Glavna, Rakovica and Topčider stations, No. 4/2019-1250/1-291 of 14.01.2019 of "IŽS" a.d. in order to harmonize its provisions with the applicable regulations and real situation on site.

BP_09/25 "IŽS" a.d. should take measures to ensure that train dispatchers working on the MMI device log in to the device with their own user account (name and password) at the beginning of the shift, and log out of their account on the device at the end of the shift.

BP_10/25 "IŽS" a.d. should analyze the reasons for the occurrence of disturbances with longer duration on SS devices. After assessing the safety risks that have arisen as a result, they should take measures to eliminate safety deficiencies (procurement of necessary resources, spare parts, mechanization, workforce), and in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Law on Railway Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 41/2018).

BP_11/25 "Srbijavoz" a.d. should carry out professional training for train drivers in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Rulebook on types of signals, signal markings and line markings ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 51/20 and 29/25) and paragraph 8 of Article 228 of the Traffic Rulebook ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 34/22 and 107/22).



5. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS AND MEASURES TAKEN

With the aim of potentially increasing railway safety and preventing the occurrence of new accidents, the CINS, Sector for Investigation of Accidents in Railway Traffic, issued 11 (eleven) safety recommendations in 2025. In 2024, 8 (eight) safety recommendations were issued, in 2023, 10 (ten) safety recommendations were issued, in 2022, 8 (eight) safety recommendations were issued, in 2021, 32 (thirty-two) safety recommendations were issued, in 2020, 10 (ten) safety recommendations were issued, in 2019, 32 (thirty-two) safety recommendations were issued, in 2018, 33 (thirty-three) safety recommendations were issued, and in 2017, 7 (seven) safety recommendations were issued.

Of the total of 151 (one hundred and fifty-one) safety recommendations issued by CINS in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025, 116 (one hundred and sixteen) safety recommendations (76.82%) were issued to the Directorate for Railways, while 35 (thirty-five) safety recommendations (23.18%) were issued to other authorities and organizations.

Table 5.1 presents the safety recommendations issued by year.

Table 5.1: Issued safety recommendations

Year	Railway directorate		Other bodies and organizations		Total	
	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]
2017	6	85.71	1	14.29	7	100.00
2018	28	84.85	5	15.15	33	100.00
2019	24	75.00	8	25.00	32	100.00
2020	7	70.00	3	30.00	10	100.00
2021	19	59.38	13	40.62	32	100.00
2022	8	100.00	-	-	8	100.00
2023	7	70.00	3	30.00	10	100.00
2024	8	100.00	-	-	8	100.00
2025	9	81.81	2	18.19	11	100.00
Total	116	76.82	35	23.18	151	100.00




Figure 5.1: Graphic representation of the issued safety recommendations over the years

In Table 5.2. is the status of safety recommendations issued over the years.

Table 5.2: Safety recommendations-status

Year	Accepted		Executed		Not accepted, no response was submitted, or the status cannot be determined from the submitted response		Total	
	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]
2017	-	-	2	28.57	5	71.43	7	100.00
2018	6	18.18	15	45.46	12	36.36	33	100.00
2019	2	6.24	15	46.88	15	46.88	32	100.00
2020	-	-	9	90.00	1	10.00	10	100.00
2021	9	28.13	14	43.75	9	28.12	32	100.00
2022	1	12.50	6	75.00	1	12.50	8	100.00
2023	6	60.00	2	20.00	2	20.00	10	100.00
2024	4	50.00	2	25.00	2	25.00	8	100.00
2025	8	72.73	2	18.18	1	9.09	11	100.00
Total	36	23.84	67	44.37	48	31.79	151	100.00




Figure 5.2: Graphical representation of the status of issued safety recommendations by year

Table 5.3 shows the status of safety recommendations issued to the Railway Directorate, by years.

Table 5.3: Issued safety recommendations to the Directorate for Railways - status

Year	Accepted		Executed		Not accepted, no response was submitted, or the status cannot be determined from the submitted response		Total	
	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]
2017	-	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67	6	100.00
2018	6	21.43	13	46.43	9	32.14	28	100.00
2019	2	8.33	9	37.50	13	54.17	24	100.00
2020	-	0.00	7	100.00	-	0.00	7	100.00
2021	8	42.11	5	26.31	6	31.58	19	100.00
2022	1	12.50	6	75.00	1	12.50	8	100.00
2023	6	85.71	1	14.29	-	0.00	7	100.00
2024	4	50.00	2	25.00	2	25.00	8	100.00
2025	8	88.89	1	11.11	-	-	9	100.00
Total	35	30.17	46	39.66	35	30.17	116	100.00



Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the status of safety recommendations issued to other bodies and organizations by year; Table 5.4 shows the status of safety recommendations issued to the MGSI, while Table 5.5 shows the status of safety recommendations issued to all other bodies and organizations.

Table 5.4: Issued safety recommendations to MGSI- status

Year	Accepted		Executed		Not accepted, no response was submitted, or the status cannot be determined from the submitted response		Total	
	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]
2017	-	-	-	-	1	100.00	1	100
2018	-	-	1	-	3	75.00	4	100
2019	-	-	6	100.00	-	-	6	100
2020	-	-	2	66.67	1	33.33	3	100
2021	1	8.33	9	75.00	2	16.67	12	100
2022	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2023	-	-	1	50.00	1	50.00	2	100
2024	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2025	-	-	1	50.00	1	50.00	2	-
Total	1	3.33	20	66.67	9	30.00	30	100

Table 5.5: Issued safety recommendations to other bodies and organizations - status

Year	Accepted		Executed		Not accepted, no response was submitted, or the status cannot be determined from the submitted response		Total	
	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]	[No.]	[%]
2017.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2018.	-	-	1	100.00	-	-	1	100.00
2019.	-	-	-	-	2	100.00	2	100.00
2020.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2021.	-	-	-	-	1	100.00	1	100.00
2022.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2023.	-	-	-	-	1	100.00	1	100.00
2024.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2025.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-	-	1		4		5	100.00

In accordance with Article 35 of the Law on the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway, and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", Nos. 66/15 and 83/18), CINS issues safety

recommendations based on data analysis and the results of the conducted investigation. These recommendations are addressed to the Railway Directorate and, where necessary, to other bodies and organizations in RS, as well as to interested bodies and organizations of other states and international organizations. The Railway Directorate takes measures to ensure that safety recommendations are taken into consideration and acted upon.

5.1. Status of safety recommendations from 2018

5.1.1. Investigation Report (ŽS-05/17) 33 No.: 340-00-10144/2017-20 dated 18.05.2018 (serious accident: collision of train No. 4905 with a road passenger vehicle on 09.10.2017 at 20:26 on the E 70/E 85 main railway line: Belgrade - Mladenovac - Lapovo - Niš - Preševo - state border - (Tabanovce), at a level crossing secured by road traffic signs and a required visibility zone, located on the open line between the Grdelica and Predejane stations)

SR_09/18 MGSI should adjust the Rulebook on the mode of crossing the railway line and the road, pedestrian or bicycle path, a place where you can carry out the intersection and measures for ensuring safe traffic ("Official Gazette of RS" No. 89/2016) with actual performances of the road vehicles (in the manner of adjustment by some countries in the region) and the actual state of the railway infrastructure.

It is necessary to determine whether the speed of the road vehicle over the crossing which is used in these calculations by this Rulebook, and which amounts to 4 km/h is suitable for the actual performances of the rolling stock, or if this speed should be enlarged (for example, in the Republic of Slovenia the speed is 7 km/h). With the speed of 4 km/h, the large number of crossings cannot satisfy the minimal required zone of visibility that the Rulebook predicts.

Explanation for the Article 11 of the Rulebook, which is given in the Article 12, and which states:

"By securing the necessary zone of visibility from the Article 11 of this Rulebook, the participants in the road traffic are enabled with uninterrupted visibility on the railway track with both sides of the road, pedestrian or bicycle path, for noticing on time of the upcoming railway vehicles on the track so that they could stop the vehicle and stop the moving of the pedestrians or bicycles before they come to the railway, that is, in front of the traffic sign that indicates the point where the road comes over the railway track at the railway level" would make sense only in the case that in front of the crossing there is no traffic sign II-2: "The obligation of stopping". Situation on site confirms that the traffic sign II-2: "The obligation of stopping", exists on all the crossings with passive signalization, which we consider absolutely necessary.

In the expression:

$$t_a = \frac{m + n + d + s}{V_p} \cdot 3,6 \text{ [s]}$$

In front of s should stand a sign "-", and not the sign "+".

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a report on the measures taken or planned to

be taken by 31 July of the current year at the latest, for the purposes of the Annual Report for 2025, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Rail and Water Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Having regard to the fact that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Crossings of Railway Lines and Roads and Measures for Ensuring Safe Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 14/2026 of 13 February 2026) has been published, the CINS concluded that SR_09/18 has been executed.

SR_10/18 “IŽS” a.d. should, considering that, due to the presence of buildings and other structures, it is not possible to ensure the required visibility in all directions even from the boundary of the danger area, consider introducing active signalling or resolve the issue in another appropriate manner.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31 July 2026. New evidence was submitted, on the basis of which it can be concluded that the implementation of the safety recommendation is underway. Safety Recommendation SR_10/18 is in progress.

SR_11/18 “IŽS” a.d. should carry out a professionally sound risk assessment at level crossings. Considering that accidents at level crossings, when considered individually, are rare events, risk assessment cannot be carried out solely on the basis of the number of accidents that have occurred at individual level crossings. As a precautionary measure, risk assessments should be carried out for all level crossings, taking into account all relevant parameters, regardless of whether accidents have occurred at those crossings.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31 July 2026. New evidence was submitted, on the basis of which it can be concluded that, compared with the CINS Annual Report for 2024, the Risk Assessment Methodology for Level Crossings of “IŽS” a.d. (Decision No. 4/2023-4461-840 dated 17 March 2023) has been applied to an additional nine level crossings, bringing the total number of level crossings covered by the Methodology since its implementation to 29. Safety Recommendation SR_11/18 is in progress.

SR-13/18 “IŽS” a.d. should develop and adopt a document entitled the “Level Crossing Resolution Programme”, based on the previously conducted risk assessment of level crossings, with the aim of undertaking specific activities to improve the level of traffic safety.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31 July 2026. New evidence was submitted concerning activities undertaken; however, these activities are not in accordance with the clearly defined safety recommendation. Safety Recommendation SR_13/18 has been accepted (implementation of Safety Recommendation SR_13/18 is possible only after Safety Recommendation SR_11/18 has been executed).

5.1.2. Investigation Report (ŽS-04/17) 33 No.: 340-00-9180/2017-18 dated 22.06.2018 (accident: derailment of a shunting composition being pushed on 17.09.2017 at 08:45 on the E70/E85 main line: (Belgrade) - Rakovica - Jajinci - Mala Krsna - Velika Krsna, between the junction “K1” and station Rakovica)

SR_20/18 “IŽS” a.d. to review the reasons why measures are not taken to urgently eliminate type “C” errors that are identified during measurement runs with measuring cars according to the Instruction on uniform criteria for monitoring the condition of tracks on the JŽ network, Instruction 339 (“Official Gazette of JŽ”, No. 2/2001 and 4/2004), and to establish coordination between the services who are to rectify the error, all under management supervision to ensure such cases are monitored and analyzed; and, based on an assessment of the resulting security risks, to implement effective measures to remedy security lapses, in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Law on Railway Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/2018) and their own Safety Management System Rules of Procedure.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted reports - letter No. 003521 184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31 July 2026 and letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 7 August 2026. New evidence regarding the implementation of the safety recommendation has been submitted. Safety recommendation SR_20/18 is in progress.

5.1.3. Investigation Report (ŽS-06/17) 33 No.: 340-00-10982/2017-16 dated 14.08.2018 (accident: derailment of train No. 56990 on 03.11.2017 at 15:25 on the local railway line Markovac - Resavica, between the Svilajnac and Despotovac stations)

SR_25/18 “IŽS” a.d. shall, given the extremely poor condition of the track, conduct a risk assessment for train operations on the local Markovac–Resavica line and implement measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Based on this, it shall carry out a professional assessment of the minimum resources (materials, machinery, manpower) required for track maintenance.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted reports - letter No. 003521 184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31 July 2026, and letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 7 August 2026. The assessment of train traffic risk has not yet commenced. No expert assessment regarding the minimum resources (machinery and manpower) required for track maintenance has been submitted. Data concerning plans to implement measures to reduce risk to an acceptable level (planned reconstruction of track sections) have been provided. Safety recommendation SR_25/18 is in progress.

5.1.4. Investigation Report (ŽS-07/17) 33 No.: 340-00-13136/2017-19 dated 26.11.2018 (accident: derailment of train No. 53527 on 23.12.2017 at 13:15 on the regional railway line Pančevo Glavna - Zrenjanin - Kikinda - state border - (Jimbolia), within the area of Novi Bečej station)

SR_29/18 “IŽS” a.d. should conduct a risk assessment for train operations on the regional railway line Pančevo Main Station – Zrenjanin – Kikinda – (Jimbolia), taking into account the inadequate maintenance and condition of the tracks, sleepers, and fastening components, and implement measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Based on this, it should carry out a professional assessment of the minimum resources (materials, machinery, and manpower) required for the maintenance of the railway line.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 7 August 2026. A risk assessment regarding train operations has not even been initiated. No expert assessment of the minimum resources required (machinery and manpower) for track maintenance has been submitted. Data regarding plans to implement measures to reduce risk to an acceptable level (planned reconstruction of sections of the track) have been submitted. Safety recommendation SR_29/18 is in progress.

5.2. Status of the safety recommendations from 2019

5.2.1. Investigation Report (ŽS-04/18) No. 340-00-1/2018-2-2-45 dated 29.11.2019 (serious accident, collision between train No. 7821 and a road vehicle a bus on 21.12.2018 at 07:30 on the E 70/E 85 main railway line: Belgrade - Mladenovac - Lapovo - Niš - Preševo - state border - (Tabanovce), at a level crossing secured by road traffic signs and a required visibility zone, located within the area of Međurovo station)

SR_24/19 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should define, within the Rulebook on the Manner of Crossing Between a Railway Line and a Road, Pedestrian or Bicycle Path, the Location Where Such a Crossing May Be Constructed, and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 89/2016), the methodology (procedure) for determining (calculating) the elements of the required visibility zone specified in Annex 9 (d_{pz} - road vehicle stopping distance and $S_{pžv}$ - railway vehicle approach distance).

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the 2025 Annual Report, which is contrary to Article 35, Paragraph 6 of the Law on the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given the publication of the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures for Ensuring Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 14/2026 dated February 13, 2026), CINS determined that recommendation SR_24/19 has been executed.

SR_25/19 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should define, within the Rulebook on the Manner of Crossing of a Railway Line and a Road, Pedestrian or Bicycle Path, the Location Where Such Crossing May Be Constructed, and Measures for Ensuring Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 89/2016), the procedure to be followed in cases where the necessary visibility exists, as defined in Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 12 of said Rulebook, yet it is not possible to secure the required visibility zone. In doing so, particular consideration should be given to the fact that the installation of traffic sign II-2: “Mandatory Stop”, combined with the provision of the necessary visibility, enables the safe crossing of road vehicles.

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the 2025 Annual Report, which is contrary to Article 35, Paragraph 6 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures for Ensuring Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 14/2026 dated February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that recommendation BP_25/19 has been executed.

SR_26/19 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should, in Article 14 of the Rulebook on the manner of crossing of the railway line and the road, pedestrian or bicycle path, the point where the crossing can be made and measures to secure the safe traffic (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 89/2016), make corrections in the expression:

$$t_v = \frac{m + n + d + s}{V_p} \cdot 3,6 \text{ [s]}$$

so that in front of s there is a sign “-”, and not the sign “+”.

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the 2025 Annual Report, which is contrary to Article 35, Paragraph 6 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures for Ensuring Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 14/2026 dated February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that recommendation SR_26/19 has been executed.

SR_27/19 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should, in the Rulebook on the manner of crossing of the railway line and the road, pedestrian or bicycle path, the point where the crossing can be made and measures to secure the safe traffic (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 89/2016), harmonize the description of the position of point B given in Article 14, Article 15 and Annex 6.

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the 2025 Annual Report, which is contrary to Article 35, Paragraph 6 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).



Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that recommendation SR_27/19 has been executed.

SR_30/19 "IŽS"a.d. is to conduct a professionally grounded risk assessment for level crossings. Given that accidents at level crossings (when viewed individually) are rare events, risk assessment cannot be based solely on the number of accidents that have occurred at specific crossings. As a precautionary measure, the risk assessment should be conducted collectively for all level crossings, based on all relevant parameters, regardless of whether or not accidents have occurred at them.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated July 31, 2026. New evidence has been provided indicating that, following the CINS Annual Report for 2024, the "IŽS"a.d. Methodology for Risk Assessment at Level Crossings (Decision No. 4/2023-4461-840 dated 17 March 2023) has been applied to nine additional level crossings, bringing the total to 29 level crossings (since the implementation of the Methodology began). Safety recommendation SR_30/19 is in progress.

SR_31/19 "IŽS"a.d. is to prepare a document titled "Programme for resolution of the level crossings", based on a previously conducted risk assessment of level crossings, with the aim of undertaking appropriate measures to enhance the level of traffic safety.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31 July 2026. New evidence was submitted regarding actions taken that do not align with the clearly issued safety recommendation. Safety recommendation SR_31/19 has been accepted (implementation of safety recommendation SR_31/19 is possible only after Safety Recommendation SR_30/19 has been executed).

5.3. Status of safety recommendations from 2020.

5.3.1. Investigation Report (ŽS-01/20) No. 340-03-1/2020-02-1-53 dated 20.11.2020 (serious accident, collision of shunting consist MS-4 with a road passenger vehicle on 09.01.2020 at 02:35 on an industrial track at the Pančevo Oil Refinery ("NIS"a.d. Novi Sad), at a level crossing secured by an automatic crossing protection system, located within the territory of the City of Pančevo, in the urban settlement of Stara Misa)

SR_10/20 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure shall align the provisions of Article 35, Paragraph 1, Item 2) of the Rulebook on the Manner of Crossing a Railway Line with a Road, Pedestrian or Bicycle Path, the Location Where Such Crossing May Be Constructed, and Measures for Ensuring Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 89/2016) with Article 58, Item 6 of Rulebook 2 – Traffic Rulebook ("Official Gazette of ZJŽ", Nos. 3/94, 4/94, 5/94, 4/96, and 6/03) and Article 124 of Instruction on Shunting 42 ("Official Gazette of ZJŽ", Nos. 3/80, 6/83, 3/87, 4/88, 6/91, and 2/94) regarding the manner in which a

railway worker assigned to a level crossing directly regulates road traffic by giving manual traffic signals to road vehicles.

Note: Article 35, paragraph 1, item 2) of the Rulebook on the Manner of Crossing a Railway Line with a Road, Pedestrian Path, or Bicycle Path, the Location Where Such a Crossing May Be Constructed, and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of the RS", No. 89/2016) refers to regulations governing road traffic safety; however, the matter in question is not defined in those regulations (it is defined only for cases involving the execution of works).

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the 2025 Annual Report, which is contrary to Article 35, Paragraph 6 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway, and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that recommendation SR_10/20 has been executed.

5.4. Status of safety recommendations from 2021

5.4.1. Investigation report (ŽS-02/20) No. 340-03-1/2020-02-2-49 from 03.03.2021 (serious accident, train number 45403 colliding with a road vehicle on 25.07.2020 at 10:55 on regional railway 211: Ruma - Šabac - Raskrtnica Donja Borina - state border - (Zvornik Novi), at a level crossing secured with traffic signs on the road and an area of required visibility, located between the Štitar intersection and the Petlovača station)

SR_03/21 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should, in the Road Law ("Official Gazette The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure of RS", no. 41/2018 and 95/2018 - other law) in Article 68, define (or supplement) maintenance - landscaping of green areas (mowing grass, clearing brush, and cutting trees) in the visibility zones at railway and road crossings in accordance with Article 38, which defines the obligation to ensure visibility zones according to regulations.

Recommendation status: MGSI has not submitted a report on the measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the Annual Report for 2025, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Rail, and Waterborne Traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", no. 66/15 and 83/18). The status of safety recommendation SR_03/21 hasn't changed compared to the Annual Report for 2022. Safety recommendation SR_03/21 has been accepted.

SR_04/21 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should, in the Rulebook on the way of crossing a railway line and a road, pedestrian or bicycle path, the place where a crossing can be made, and measures to ensure safe traffic (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 89/2016), define the methodology (way) for determining (calculating) the elements of the visibility zone given in Annex 9 (d_{pz} - stopping distance of a road vehicle and $S_{pžv}$ - approach distance of a railway vehicle).

Recommendation status: MGSI has not submitted a report on the measures that have been taken or are planned to be taken by July 31 of this year for the Annual Report for 2025, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on Accident Investigation in Air, Rail, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that SR_04/21 has been executed.

SR_05/21 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should define in the Rulebook on the way of crossing a railway line and a road, pedestrian or bicycle path, the place where a crossing can be made, and measures to ensure safe traffic (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 89/2016), the procedure in cases when the required visibility according to the definition in Article 2, paragraph 1, item 12) of this Rulebook exists, but it is not possible to secure the zone of the required visibility. In this, special attention should be given to the fact that by placing traffic sign II-2: “Mandatory Stop” along with securing the necessary visibility, it allows safe crossing of road vehicles over the crossing.

Recommendation status: MGSI has not submitted a report on the measures that have been taken or are planned to be taken by July 31 of the current year for the Annual Report for 2025, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Rail, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that SR_05/21 has been executed.

SR_06/21 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure, to make corrections in the expression in Article 14 of the Rulebook on the manner of crossing of the railway line and the road, pedestrian or bicycle path, the place where the crossing can be made and the measures for ensuring safe traffic (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 89/2016):

$$t_v = \frac{m + n + d + s}{V_p} \cdot 3,6 \text{ [s]}$$

so that in front of s there is a sign “-”, and not the sign “+”.

Recommendation status: The MCTI has not submitted a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of this year for the Annual Report for 2025, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Rail, and Water Traffic (“Official Gazette RS”, No. 66/15 and 83/18).



Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that SR_06/21 has been executed.

SR_07/21 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure to harmonize, in the Rulebook on the manner of crossing of the railway line and the road, pedestrian or bicycle path, the place where the crossing can be made and the measures for ensuring safe traffic ("Official Gazette of RS" No. 89/2016), the description of the position of point B given in Article 14, Article 15 and Annex 6.

Recommendation status: The MCTI has not submitted a report on measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of this year for the Annual Report for 2025, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Rail, and Water Traffic ("Official Gazette RS", No. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that SR_07/21 has been executed.

SR_09/21 "IZS"a.d. is asked to consider changing the safety level at the road crossing in question (introducing active signalling), or to solve the problem in some other way. Given the presence of buildings near the crossing and a curve on the railway, the required visibility zone is not ensured, and due to dense vegetation in the infrastructure zone, and consequently in the railway zone, the necessary visibility is also not ensured. It is also a fact that this road crossing represents the intersection of a regional railway and a state road of the IIa order.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. New evidence has been provided on the basis of which it can be concluded that the implementation of the safety recommendation is underway. The safety recommendation SR_09/21 is in progress.

SR_10/21 "IZS"a.d. should carry out a professionally grounded risk assessment at railway crossings. Considering that accidents at railway crossings (looking at each crossing individually) are rare events, the risk assessment cannot be based solely on the number of accidents that have occurred at individual crossings. The risk assessment, as a precautionary measure, should be conducted collectively for all crossings according to all relevant parameters, regardless of whether accidents have occurred there or not.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. New evidence has been provided, based on which it can be noted that, compared to the CINS Annual Report for 2024, the Risk Assessment Methodology for railway crossings of "IZS"a.d. (Decision No. 4/2023-4461-840 dated 17.03.2023) has been applied to nine more railway crossings, making a total of 29 crossings (since the methodology was first applied). Safety recommendation SR_10/21 is in progress.

SR_11/21 “IZS”a.d. to prepare the act “Programme for resolution of the level crossings” based on the previously carried out risk assessment at railway crossings, with the aim of taking appropriate actions to improve traffic safety.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. New evidence has been provided regarding the actions taken, which are not in line with the clearly issued safety recommendation. Safety recommendation SR_11/21 has been accepted (implementation of safety recommendation SR_11/21 is possible only after Safety Recommendation SR_10/21 has been executed).

5.4.2. Investigation report (ŽS-03/20) No. 340-00-2/2020-02-1-53 dated 17.11.2021 (accident, derailment of train No. 45022, from 28.11.2020 at 19:27 on the main railway line 102: Belgrade Center - Junction “G” - Rakovica - Mladenovac - Lapovo - Niš - Preševo - state border - (Tabanovce), between Bagrdan and Jagodina stations, on the left track of the double-track line)

SR_13/21 “IŽS”a.d., considering the inadequate maintenance and condition of the tracks, sleepers, and fastenings, as well as the insufficient number of maintenance workers in the construction sector, prepare a risk assessment for train traffic on the main line 102: Belgrade Center - Junction “G” - Rakovica - Mladenovac - Lapovo - Niš - Preševo - state border - (Tabanovce), left track, from Markovac station (exclusive) km 101+057 to Jagodina station (inclusive) km 136+000, and take measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted reports - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026 and letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_13/21 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. Safety recommendation SR_13/21 is accepted.

SR_14/21 “IŽS”a.d, to consider in the Rulebook on the organization and job classification of the Joint Stock Company for managing public railway infrastructure “Railway Infrastructure of Serbia” Belgrade, the adequacy of the existing staff and the possibility of providing an appropriate number of workers in the construction sector both on the section of the railway where the accident occurred and throughout the entire network, with the aim of ensuring the safe operation of railway traffic. According to the appropriate number of workers, to plan the procurement of necessary machinery and tools, all in order to ensure the safe operation of railway traffic.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted reports - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026 and letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. The provided data show that safety recommendation SR_14/21 is in progress.

5.4.2. Investigation report (ŽS-04/20) No. 340-03-1/2020-02-3-42 dated 22.11.2021 (serious accident, train No. 6431 colliding with a road passenger vehicle on 02.12.2020, at 08:15 on the main railway line 110: Subotica - Bogojevo - state border - (Erđut), at a level crossing secured with automatic half-barriers with traffic lights and road signs, located in the settlement area of Bajmok)

SR_26/21 “IŽS” a.d., to carry out a review of the technical documentation and diagnostic software for the PZZ-EA railway crossing device, and to consider the need for their supplementation and correction in terms of proper and clear translation into Serbian using precise and professional terminology. This primarily refers to the operating and maintenance documentation for the device, so that the content of the mentioned documentation is clear to maintenance staff.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_26/21 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. Safety recommendation SR_26/21 is in progress.

SR_28/21 “IŽS” a.d., to consider in the Rulebook on the Organization and Classification of Jobs of the Joint Stock Company for Managing Public Railway Infrastructure “Railway Infrastructure of Serbia” in Belgrade, the adequacy of the existing staff and explore the possibility of providing an appropriate number of employees in the electrotechnical field (workers for maintaining signalling devices and installations) both on the section of the railway where a serious accident occurred and throughout the entire network, so that the time to address faults is reduced to a level in line with the Rulebook on the Maintenance of Signalling and Security Devices (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/18), thereby minimizing the time signalling devices spend in a faulty state, all aiming for the safe conduct of railway traffic.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter no. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_28/21 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. The safety recommendation SR_28/21 is in progress.

SR_29/21 “IŽS” a.d. is to carry out activities to obtain a use permit from the Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure for the level crossing at km 102+890, in accordance with Article 158 of the Law on Planning and Construction (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 72/2009, 81/2009 - correction, 64/2010 - Constitutional Court decision, 24/2011, 121/2012, 42/2013 - Constitutional Court decision, 50/2013 - Constitutional Court decision, 98/2013 - Constitutional Court decision, 132/2014, 145/2014, 83/2018, 31/2019, 37/2019 - other law, 9/2020 and 52/2021).

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_29/21 has not changed compared to the 2024 Annual Report. Safety recommendation SR_29/21 has been accepted.

SR_32/21 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure should align Article 2, item 11, and Annex 2 of the Rulebook on the way to cross a railway line with a road, pedestrian, or bicycle path, the place where the crossing can be made, and the measures to ensure traffic safety (“Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 89/2016) with Annex 2 of the Rulebook on technical conditions for signalling and safety devices (“Official Gazette of the RS”, Nos. 18/2016 and 89/2016) regarding the definition of the boundary of the danger zone at a level crossing or the boundary of the clearance profile.

Recommendation Status: MGSI has not submitted a report on the measures taken or planned to be taken by July 31 of this year for the Annual Report for 2025, which is against Article 35, paragraph 6 of the Law on Investigation of Accidents in Air, Rail, and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 66/15 and 83/18).

Given that the Rulebook on the Manner and Location of Level Crossings and Measures to Ensure Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 14/2026 of February 13, 2026) has been published, CINS determined that SR_32/21 has not been executed.

5.5. Status of safety recommendations from 2022.

5.5.1. Investigation report (ŽS-02/21) No. 340-01-1/2021-02-2-42 dated 01.06.2022 (serious accident, collision of a pushed shunting train with a railway worker on 12.07.2021 at 07:43 in the area of the industrial railway of JP “EPS” TENT Branch from Obrenovac, at Obrenovac station)

SR_08/22 JP “EPS” Branch TENT from Obrenovac to consider the possibility of a practical solution for installing steps and handrails on the front sides of Arbel cars of the Faboo series for the safe presence of an attendant during shunting operations, or to apply other measures so that shunting with an attendant is carried out in accordance with the Shunting Instructions 42 (“Official Gazette of ZJŽ” No. 3/80, 6/83, 3/87, 4/88, 6/91, and 2/94) or the Traffic Regulations (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 34/22).

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate sent a letter No. 004250039 2025 12500 001 001 016 12 03 001 on 21.10.2025. The provided evidence shows that safety recommendation SR_08/22 is in progress.

5.6. Status of safety recommendations from 2023

5.6.1. Investigation report (ŽS-01/22) No. 40-00-2/2022-02-1-120 from 12.10.2023 (serious accident, derailment of train No. 45010, on 25.12.2022 at 16:45 on main railway line 106: Niš - Dimitrovgrad - state border - (Dragoman), between the Staničenje crossing and Pirot station)

SR_02/23 The Railway Directorate should make amendments and additions to the Rulebook on the Maintenance of the Upper and Lower Structure of Railway Tracks (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 39/23 of May 12, 2023) by removing, in Article 5, paragraph 2, item 1), the speed reduction as a measure to reduce the risk of train derailments in case the values of track geometry parameters exceed the limit for urgent (immediate) intervention.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_02/23 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2023. Safety recommendation SR_02/23 has been taken into account.

SR_03/23 The Railway Directorate should make amendments and additions to point 4, subpoint 5) of Annex 3 of the Rulebook on brakes and train and vehicle braking (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 68 of 7.07.2021) in accordance with the relevant IRS 40421 requirements.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_03/23 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2023. The safety recommendation SR_03/23 is accepted.

SR_04/23 “IŽS” a.d. to review the reasons why over a long period there has been a large number of type “C” errors found during test runs with measurement vehicles according to the Instructions on Unified Criteria for Monitoring Track Conditions on the JŽ network, Instruction 339 (“Official Gazette of ZJŽ”, No. 2/2001 and 4/2004, “Official Gazette of ŽS”, No. 14/22). Based on the assessment of the safety risks that arose because of this, take effective measures to eliminate safety gaps, in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Railway Safety Act (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/2018) and its own Safety Management System Rulebook.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. New evidence regarding the implementation of the safety recommendation has been provided. Safety recommendation SR_04/23 is in progress.



SR_05/23 “IZS” a.d. to make changes and additions to the Instructions on uniform criteria for monitoring the condition of tracks on the JŽ network, Instruction 339 (“Official Gazette of ZJŽ”, Nos. 2/2001 and 4/2004, “Official Gazette of ŽS”, No. 14/22, which by the decision of “IZS” a.d. No. 4/2015-51-17 from 29.12.2015 is still in effect for “IZS” a.d.), in accordance with the provisions of Instruction 339 from 1989.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence on the implementation of this safety recommendation has been provided. The status of safety recommendation SR_05/23 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. Safety recommendation SR_05/23 has been accepted.

SR_06/23 “IŽS” a.d., considering the inadequate maintenance and the condition of the tracks, sleepers, and fastening equipment, should carry out a risk assessment of train traffic on the main railway line 106: Niš - Dimitrovgrad - state border - (Dragoman) and take measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Based on that, they should perform a professional assessment of the minimum necessary resources (materials, machinery, workforce) required for railway maintenance.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 from 07.08.2026. The train traffic risk assessment hasn't even started. A professional assessment of the minimum necessary resources (materials, machinery, and workforce) for railway maintenance has not been provided. Data on plans for taking measures to reduce risk to an acceptable level have been supplied. Safety recommendation SR_06/23 is in progress.

SR_07/23 “IŽS” a.d. to consider in its Rulebook on organization and systematization of tasks within the Joint Stock Company for the Management of Public Railway Infrastructure “IŽS” a.d. and to examine the possibility of predicting an appropriate number of staff in the construction sector, both for the section of the track where the accident occurred and for the entire network, in order to ensure the safe operation of railway traffic. In accordance with the appropriate number of staff, they should plan the procurement of necessary machinery and tools, all with the aim of ensuring safe railway traffic.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. Evidence regarding the implementation of the safety recommendation has been provided. Safety recommendation SR_07/23 is in progress.



5.7. Status of safety recommendations from 2024

5.7.1. Investigation Report (ŽS-01/23) No. 340-00-1/2023-02-1-87 from 31.06.2024 (serious accident, collision of trains No. 25412 and 49028/73478, on 17.11.2023, at 18:42 on regional railway 207: Novi Sad - Odžaci - Bogojevo, between Ratkovo and Odžaci stations).

SR_01/24 The Railway Directorate, in accordance with Article 37 of the Law on Railway Safety ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 41/18), should amend and supplement the Regulation on Technical Conditions and Maintenance of the Railway Telecommunications Network ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 68/21), in Part II. Technical Conditions for the Railway Telecommunications Network, where the minimum technical requirements for equipping tracks with telecommunications devices should be clearly and precisely defined depending on train speed, track categorization, volume of railway traffic, and similar factors.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_01/24 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. Safety recommendation SR_01/24 has been taken into account.

SR_02/24 IŽS a.d. is required, regarding the maintenance of public railway infrastructure concerning elements of the control, command, and signaling subsystem, to replace and replenish missing or worn-out system elements on regional railway line 207: Novi Sad - Odžaci - Bogojevo in order to avoid compromising the designed technical functionality of said subsystem elements, pursuant to Articles 55 and 56 of the Law on Railways ("Official Gazette of RS", Nos. 41/18 and 62/23).

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_02/24 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. Safety recommendation SR_02/24 has been accepted.

SR_04/24 "IŽS" a.d. that on regional railway line 207: Novi Sad - Odžaci - Bogojevo, is to consider the possibility of replacing SS systems that lack mandatory technical interlocking between switch positions and entry signals, as well as the absence of interlocked exit signals and the use of telecommunications equipment with limited technical capabilities, with SS systems offering a higher level of mandatory technical interlocking and more modern, commercially available telecommunications equipment, with the aim of reducing the risk of human error in train traffic regulation and enhancing railway safety.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate has submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence has been provided regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation. The status of safety recommendation SR_04/24 has not changed compared to the Annual Report for 2024. Safety recommendation SR_04/24 has been accepted.

SR_06/24 “IŽS” a.d. is to conduct professional training for traffic control personnel (train dispatchers) on the Novi Sad - Odžaci - Bogojevo railway line (Line 207) regarding train traffic regulation, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 121, 122, 133, and 141 of the Traffic Regulations (“Official Gazette of RS”, Nos. 34/22, 107/22).

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003690729 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 07.08.2026. No new evidence regarding the implementation of this safety recommendation has been submitted. The status of safety recommendation SR_06/24 remains unchanged compared to the 2024 Annual Report. Safety recommendation SR_06/24 has been accepted.

5.8. Status of safety recommendations from 2025

5.8.1. Investigation Report (ŽS-01/19) No. 340-00-1/2019-02-1-110 of 10.03.2025 (accident, train No. 52770 derailment, from 14.02.2019 at 01:45 on the regional railway line: Crveni Krst - Zajecar - Prahovo Pristaniste between the stations Svrlijig and Knjazevac)

SR_01/25 The Directorate for Railways should, as soon as possible, amend the current Regulation on the Maintenance of the Super and Structure of Railway Tracks (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 39/2023) to define the limit states of track elements requiring immediate rectification or track closure until the unacceptable condition is resolved. Additionally, the regulation should stipulate that in cases of “Type C” defects or those exceeding the “IAL” (Immediate Action Limit) for track widening and twist, speed reduction cannot be considered a measure to mitigate the risk of derailment. Instead, only urgent intervention or track closure should be undertaken.

Recommendation status: The Directorate for Railways submitted a report – letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.06.2026. Safety Recommendation SR_01/25 has been taken into account.

SR_02/25 The Directorate for Railways, in accordance with Article 37 of the Law on Railway Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 41/18), should amend and supplement the Regulation on Technical Conditions and Maintenance of the Railway Telecommunications Network (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 68/21). In Section II: Technical Conditions for the Railway Telecommunications Network, the regulation should define the minimum technical requirements for equipping railway lines with telecommunication devices to ensure reliable communication between traffic control personnel and train drivers. These requirements should be based on factors such as train speed, track categorization, volume of railway traffic, and similar considerations.

Recommendation status: The Directorate for Railways submitted a report – letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.06.2026. Safety Recommendation SR_02/25 has been taken into account.

SR_03/25 “IŽS”a.d, should amend and supplement the Instruction on Unified Criteria for Track Condition Control on the Railway Network (Instruction 339, “Official Gazette of the ZJŽ” No. 2/2001 and 4/2004). The amendments should stipulate that in cases of “Type C” defects or those exceeding the “IAL” (Immediate Action Limit), for track widening and twist, speed reduction cannot be considered a measure to mitigate the risk of derailment. Instead, only urgent intervention or track closure should be implemented.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report – letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.06.2026. Evidence was submitted demonstrating that Safety Recommendation SR_03/25 has been taken into account and is in progress.

SR_04/25 “IŽS”a.d, should review the adequacy of the current provisions in the Regulation on the Organization and Systematization of Work Positions of the Joint Stock Company for the Management of Public Railway Infrastructure “Infrastruktura Železnice Srbije” Belgrade. It should also assess the possibility of ensuring an appropriate number of personnel in construction activities, both on the section of the railway where the accident occurred and across the entire network, with the aim of ensuring the safe operation of railway traffic. In line with the appropriate number of personnel, the company should plan the procurement of the necessary machinery and tools, all in the interest of maintaining the safety of railway traffic.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.06.2026. Evidence was submitted demonstrating that Safety Recommendation SR_04/25 has been taken into account and is in progress.

SR_05/25 “IŽS”a.d, when approving special shipments/consignments that exceed the allowed axle load or allowed weight per meter of track on a transport route or section of the transport route, it is mandatory to conduct an analysis of the track’s load-bearing capacity and assess the condition of the super and substructure of the track.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.06.2026. Evidence was submitted demonstrating that Safety Recommendation SR_05/25 has been taken into account and is in progress.

SR_06/25 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure, Sector for Railways and Intermodal Transport, considering that Article 49 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023) stipulates that the infrastructure register is maintained by the European Union Agency for Railways, and that this has not been formally enabled for infrastructure managers in RS in practice, should resolve this issue to ensure the application of the provisions of Article 49 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023). If this issue is not resolved, or the provisions of Article 49 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023) cannot be applied, the Ministry should amend and supplement the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System



(“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023), or restore the provisions of Article 34 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 41/2018), as well as the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” Nos. 41/2018 and 16/2022 - Authentic Interpretation), in order to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructure register by the Directorate for Railways.

Recommendation status: MGSI did not submit a response - a report on the measures taken or planned to be taken by 31 July of the current year at the latest for the 2025 Annual Report, which is contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 35 of the Law on the Investigation of Accidents in Air, Railway and Waterborne Traffic (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 66/15 and 83/18). The status of Safety Recommendation SR_06/25 is unknown.

SR_07/25 The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure, Sector for Inspection Supervision, Railway Traffic Inspection Department, should, in accordance with Article 50 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023), to carry out an inspection supervision at “IŽS” a.d. and take measures within its authority regarding the obtaining of permits for renovated and upgraded tracks in accordance with Article 36 of the Law on the Interoperability of the Railway System (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 62/2023), starting from the adoption of the first version of the law in 2018.

Recommendation status: MGSI, Sector for Inspection Supervision, Railway Traffic Inspection Department submitted letter No. 001188800 2025 14810 009 030 000 001 dated 28.07.2025. In the attachment to letter, the Minutes of Extraordinary Desk-Based Inspection Supervision were submitted. The Safety Recommendation SR_07/25 has been executed.

5.8.2. Investigation Report (ŽS-01/24) No. 340-00-2/2024-02-1-70 dated 22.07.2025 (accident: collision between successive trains No. 7112 and 52601 on 17.05.2024 at 18:24 on main railway line 107: Belgrade Center - Pančevo Main Station - Vršac - state border - (Stamora Moravita), between Vukov Spomenik station and the Pančevački Most junction/stop)

BP_08/25 “IŽS” a.d. should amend the Business order of the Vukov Spomenik station, part I, document No. 31/18-I-2252 of 28.12.2018 and the Instructions on the organization and operation of the operational service on parts of railway lines between the Beograd Centar, Pančevo Glavna, Rakovica and Topčider stations, No. 4/2019-1250/1-291 of 14.01.2019 of “IŽS” a.d. in order to harmonize its provisions with the applicable regulations and real situation on site.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. Evidence has been submitted that the safety recommendation SR_08/25 has been taken into account and is in progress.



BP_09/25 “IŽS“a.d. should take measures to ensure that train dispatchers working on the MMI device log in to the device with their own user account (name and password) at the beginning of the shift, and log out of their account on the device at the end of the shift.

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter: No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 of 31.07.2026. Evidence has been submitted that the safety recommendation SR_09/25 has been taken into account and is in progress.

BP_10/25 “IŽS“a.d. should analyze the reasons for the occurrence of disturbances with longer duration on SS devices. After assessing the safety risks that have arisen as a result, they should take measures to eliminate safety deficiencies (procurement of necessary resources, spare parts, mechanization, workforce), and in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 of the Law on Railway Traffic Safety (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 41/2018).

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted a report - letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated July 31, 2026. Evidence has been submitted that the safety recommendation SR_10/25 has been taken into account and is in progress.

BP_11/25 “Srbijavoz“a.d. should carry out professional training for train drivers in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Rulebook on types of signals, signal markings and line markings (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 51/20 and 29/25) and paragraph 8 of Article 228 of the Traffic Rulebook (“Official Gazette of RS”, No. 34/22 and 107/22).

Recommendation status: The Railway Directorate submitted reports - letters No. 004250039 2025 12500 001 001 016 12 03 001 dated 21.10.2025, letter No. 000580530 2026 12500 001 001 016 012 03 001 dated 13.02.2026, and letter No. 003521184 2026 12500 001 001 340 039 01 002 dated 31.07.2026. Evidence has been submitted that the safety recommendation SR_11/25 has been executed.